The earthquake that struck western and central Gujarat on January 26, 2000 caused enormous loss of life and near total destruction of physical assets, affecting around 20 million people. The state was totally unprepared for the disaster; immediate response was very poor.

This case study examines the impact of the quake on Kutch.

The earthquake that struck western and central Gujarat on January 26, 2000 caused enormous loss of life, and near total destruction of physical assets, affecting around 20 million people. The state was totally unprepared for the disaster and immediate response was very poor.

The health and education infrastructure was severely damaged. Two district hospitals, over 1,200 health clinics (mostly in rural areas), and over 11,600 schools were destroyed or damaged.

There was similar destruction of both rural and urban water supply schemes. Over 240 earthen dams that provided water for irrigation, rural and urban domestic needs, and industry were damaged. Other infrastructure services like electricity and telecommunications were extensively damaged. Small enterprises especially single-family artisans, shopkeepers and rural industries were also affected.

Although Gujarat is relatively richer and has grown faster than other Indian states, the area most severely affected by the earthquake is economically poor. The main areas affected were the districts of Kutch, where over 90 per cent of the deaths and 85 per cent of asset losses occurred, and the districts of Jamnagar, Rajkot, and Surendranagar.

Kutch is a sparsely populated, resource poor, arid region, vulnerable not only to earthquakes but also to cyclones and drought. The main sources of employment are agriculture, animal husbandry, salt mining and refining, handicrafts and trade. Kutch accounts for less than two per cent of industrial employment in the state and there is little large-scale industry. Agriculture is largely rain-fed and there are few perennial crops. The agriculture and dairy sectors have little mechanisation and thus low levels of capital intensity. Although some households benefit from money transfers from relatives working in Mumbai and abroad, poverty is higher and social indicators are the worst in the earthquake-affected areas than in the rest of the state. Kutch also has the largest proportion of scheduled caste people in Gujarat --12 per cent, compared to seven per cent in Gujarat as a whole. The earthquake struck here in the wake of two consecutive years of drought in 1999 and 2000.

The large number of human deaths and injuries has devastated the social fabric of the earthquake-hit areas. In addition to the immediate suffering, large numbers of families have been torn by the death or a serious disability of a family member. This will have long-term consequences on the well-being of other members, particularly widows, single-parent children, orphans and the elderly.

Other social consequences of the earthquake include deep insecurity among those who have lost assets, including property, increasing their vulnerability to poverty. The livelihoods of many families have been disrupted. About 19,000 handicraft artisans in the district of Kutch appear to be the most severely-affected group. In addition, several thousand salt farmers are faced with the collapse of their brine wells, destruction of salt fields, and damage to their refineries. Another important source of livelihood in Kutch is cattle -- and about 20,000 cattle deaths have been reported.

The Government of Gujarat, as well as a large number of non-governmental organisations including philanthropic groups, development agencies and private businesses, have stepped in to provide short-term as well as long-term relief and rehabilitation.

The Government of Gujarat has set up the Gujarat State Disaster Management Authority (www.gsdma.org) to coordinate relief and rehabilitation activities in the state.

Gujarat, particularly Kutch, Rajkot and Bhavnagar, has witnessed numerous earthquakes in the past. From 1842 to 2000 there were at least 25 earthquakes. The area falls under seismic zone V and IV, ie highly earthquake-prone. Despite this knowledge, the state's degree of preparedness for the quake that struck on January 26, 2001 was almost zero.

The government's water supply, electricity, public works, telecommunications and health departments came to a virtual standstill for about 48 hours after the quake, due to the collapse of buildings on a large scale. This impaired the resumption of such emergency services and handicapped these departments considerably.

As the earthquake struck on India's Republic Day -- a national holiday, followed by a weekend, a number of key officials were out of town on holiday. Due to the breakdown of the telecommunications network, they could not be contacted and it was nearly impossible for officials on location to restore essential services, or even locate standby equipment like generators. Thus, even available resources could not be mobilised into action.

This led to a sense of panic and helplessness. There was no disaster management at all for the first two days. The first slow signs of life in relief operations appeared on the third day, ie January 28, 2001. Sporadic signs of rescue came from the Indian Army, which swung into action almost immediately after the quake -- about an hour after the disaster had struck.

Army personnel reported that for almost 72 hours after the earthquake struck, the general public was in a state of shock and of no help in the rescue operations. Even the collector of Kutch was in a state of shock, and a new collector, Anil Mukhim, was brought in, to take charge.

All the government bodies lamented that they did not have adequate equipment to help in the rescue operations -- not even generators to assist the rescue work at night. The army reported that they could hear victims crying out from under the debris, but in the absence of electricity they could do little to extricate them. Without heavy machines, relief personnel could do nothing to remove huge concrete blocks and rubble.

There was a total absence of communication between the district and state headquarters. Loss of time in critical decision-making meant more loss of lives, disabilities and despair. Ultimately, decision-making was delegated, with officials of the rank of collectors being posted at the taluka level.

NGOs admitted that they were of no help in the rescue operations; they were more involved in relief and presently are engaged in rehabilitation work.